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Chill
Jennifer M. Kinsley*
Courts frequently assess the constitutionality of government regulation
on free speech by reference to the law’s impact on hypothetical
expression not before the court. In some instances, courts have permitted
litigants whose speech is not regulated by a statute to nevertheless raise
First Amendment overbreadth challenges on the basis that third-party
expression might be chilled—as in, silenced. Still, in other instances,
courts have invalidated government regulation on the basis of its impact
upon the hypothetical expression of others. In either event, the concept
of a chilling effect is a speculative and superfluous misnomer that has no
place in First Amendment free speech jurisprudence. The chilling effect
doctrine, which reasons that laws that chill speech are unconstitutional,
makes too many false assumptions about the speakers’ knowledge of the
law, their ability to correctly apply the law, and their willingness to
conform to the law in order to adequately capture constitutionally
protected speech. For this reason, whether a law might deter putative
speakers from engaging in their desired expression is an important
concern, but one that should be abandoned as a measure of constitutional
standing and harm.
To date, scholars have addressed the chilling effect doctrine only in
relation to other aspects of constitutional law without fully contemplating
its role in First Amendment jurisprudence. As a result, the relevant
literature is highly fractured. By focusing solely on the chilling effect
doctrine and its shaky underpinnings, this Article draws from existing
scholarship to create a new, universal framework for critiquing the
doctrine. Because the chilling effect doctrine arises from faulty
assumptions regarding knowledge and conformity, it should be abdicated
and replaced with a direct impact test premised on how hypothetical
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Chill (verb)–
: to make (someone or something) cold or cool
: to become cold or cool
: to cause (someone) to feel afraid
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015).
Chill–
1. hang out
2. relax
3. stop doing something

Urban Dictionary (June 15, 2002).
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“[T]he fear of the censor by the composer of ideas acts as a substantial
deterrent to the creation of new thoughts.”1 The potential deterrent to
creativity that influenced Justice Earl Warren’s dissenting opinion in
Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, more than fifty years ago,
has since polluted First Amendment jurisprudence through the chilling
effect doctrine.2 Now, courts frequently assess the constitutionality of
government regulation on free speech by reference to a challenged law’s
impact on hypothetical expression that is not before the court, or the
potential, eventual censorship—rather than a cognizable harm to the
actual plaintiff. The idea that a particular restriction on speech might
cause other individuals to silence themselves or censor their own
expression was first acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court
in the abovementioned Times Film Corporation,3 and has since been used
to justify expanding traditional notions of standing and constitutional
harm in First Amendment cases.
In some instances, courts have permitted litigants, whose speech is not
regulated by the statute in question, to nevertheless raise overbreadth
challenges4 on the basis that third-party expression might be chilled.5 In
this regard, the chilling effect doctrine serves as a gateway to expanded
standing for parties whose speech is either unprotected or only marginally
protected by the Constitution. In other instances, courts have invalidated
government regulation on the basis of its impact upon the hypothetical
expression of others. Here, the notion of “chill” serves as a substitute for
constitutional injury, such that the very concept of self-censorship is itself
a harm that can be remedied by the courts.
In either event, the concept of chilling effect is a speculative and
superfluous misnomer that threatens the consistency of First Amendment
free speech jurisprudence. It is of important concern when a putative
speaker’s intended speech is subject to self-censorship as a result of
government regulation—but interweaving that concern into existing free
1. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 75 (1961) (Warren, J., dissenting).
2. Id.
3. See generally id. (majority opinion) (discussing the censorship of a movie film).
4. The overbreadth doctrine holds that a law regulating speech violates the First Amendment
when a substantial number of its applications prohibit protected expression when judged in
comparison to its plainly legitimate sweep. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010)
(citing Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6
(2008)).
5. This Article uses the concept of “chill” or “chilling effect” to reference the pressure placed
on a potential speaker by legislative enactments to remain silent. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (“Litigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own
rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the
statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression.”).
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speech doctrine potentially interrupts the intentions of the First
Amendment. To be sure, scholars have long criticized the role that
chilling effect plays in analyzing free speech, noting that its
immeasurable quality and focus on the hypothetical limit its efficacy in
protecting actual expression. Nevertheless, scholars have failed to
generate any consistent view on why the chilling effect doctrine should
be abandoned—and this Article seeks to do just that. Focusing
exclusively on the chilling effect doctrine and its shaky underpinnings,
this Article creates a new, universal framework for critiquing the doctrine
that is unrelated to pre-existing doctrinal bias. Rather than considering
whether hypothetical speech retains normative value and then assessing
whether the chilling effect doctrine effectively captures that expression,
this Article’s approach instead argues that the concept of the chilling
effect doctrine was flawed from its inception because it rests on faulty
theoretical judgments.
This Article therefore advocates for a potential transition in First
Amendment jurisprudence from tests that analyze hypothetical situations
to tests that ascertain a challenged law’s direct and actual impact on
speech. This Article expands upon the existing literature and argues that
the chilling effect test rests upon numerous faulty assumptions
unsupported by law, theory, or empirical fact. Underlying the notion that
speech may be impermissibly chilled by government regulation are at
least three assumptions: (1) that the speaker is aware of the law’s
existence; (2) that the speaker is aware that his or her speech is covered
by the law or maintains a reasonable uncertainty as to whether his speech
is covered; and (3) that the speaker is willing to comply with the law by
both censoring his or her own speech and remaining silent as to his or her
election to do so. This Article argues that each of these premises is wrong
and concludes that the chilling effect doctrine should be abdicated.
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of chilling effect doctrine
and how it has evolved into a substitute for both standing and injury in
First Amendment cases. This Part examines not only the theoretical
underpinnings of the chilling effect test, but also categorizes current
judicial approaches to the standard and how it is presently being used to
assess the constitutionality of governmental regulation. Part I also
includes an overview of the existing literature on chilling effect and its
focus on how the doctrine overlaps with other aspects of First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Part II of this Article expands upon the approach to the chilling effect
that is currently held by free speech scholars and unpacks the three
improper premises upon which the chilling effect doctrine rests. As Part
II demonstrates, the average reasonable person is likely unaware of the
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vast myriad of regulations on their speech, and even further does not
grasp how to apply those regulations to the nuances of their own
expression. Moreover, the mere fact that courts routinely consider First
Amendment challenges in both civil and criminal cases, where speech
has taken place in the wake of laws prohibiting it, undercuts the notion
that speech regulations actually chill speech.
Part III of this Article implements a new approach to chill and proposes
that a direct impact standard should replace the chilling effect test. Rather
than considering whether unknown individuals would, in theory, be
chilled in their individual expressions, courts should instead focus on how
the proposed speech—if the speaker chooses to present it—would fare
under the challenged regulation. This approach is superior because it
employs existing First Amendment standards to address actual speech,
rather than relying upon unknowable assumptions and mere conjecture.
Because the concept of chilling effect is speculative, unknowable,
immeasurable, and theoretically unjustifiable, this Article asserts that it
should be abdicated as a measure of First Amendment standing or harm.
A better perspective is one that considers a regulation’s direct impact on
speech, rather than whether the speech would be subject to selfcensorship in the hypothetical.
I. THE LAW OF CHILLING EFFECT
The notion that laws regulating speech may act as a deterrent to
expression factors into First Amendment free speech jurisprudence in two
distinct ways. First, courts consider whether hypothetical chilled
expression constitutes a cognizable injury sufficient to vest standing to
challenge a speech regulation.6 In this regard, courts assess whether a
self-imposed chill is both actual and the result of government action
before permitting facial challenges to laws regulating speech. Second,
once the initial standing requirement has been satisfied, courts also
consider the notion that laws may deter speech in analyzing whether the
challenged regulation comports with the First Amendment. In this
context, the very idea that certain speech may not exist as a result of
deterrent legislation constitutes a constitutional harm that can be
remedied by the courts.7
The development of the chilling effect doctrine has been intertwined
with the components of standing and harm, and, for this reason, can be
6. To obtain standing, or the legal ability, to challenge a legislative enactment, a party must
have first suffered an “injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
7. An injury must also be capable of redress by the courts for a party to have standing to sue.
Id.
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difficult to parse. Tracing the concept to its origins proves useful in
understanding how chilled expression serves as a gateway to challenging
speech-related laws and a basis for striking down these regulatory
enactments.
A. Development of the Chilling Effect Doctrine as a Measure of Free
Speech
The phrase “chilling effect” first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion
in 1961.8 Justice Earl Warren, in his dissent from the majority opinion
that upheld a Chicago ordinance requiring a permit to publicly exhibit a
motion picture, posited a number of scenarios in which the speechpermitting scheme might suppress expression, rightfully or wrongfully.9
In his dissent, Justice Warren first observed that requiring a permit to
exhibit a film would likely deter individuals from displaying obscene
motion pictures, which he labeled as both intended and permissible
impacts of the ordinance.10 But, he was troubled by two additional,
possible outcomes, neither of which would comport with his view of the
First Amendment. In one example, a film might be improperly censored
by the government when the film’s presenter is denied a permit based on
a false categorization of the material. Here, Justice Warren worried that
speakers would be unlikely to assert a legal challenge to the permit denial
due to the numerous financial and logistical deterrents to proceeding in
court.11 Equally problematic in Justice Warren’s dissent was the
hypothetical scenario in which the speaker, desiring to present a lawful
film, did not seek a permit at all out of fear that he or she would be denied
government permission.12
In what remains as one of the most poignant explanations of chilling
effect, Justice Warren emphatically concluded: “the fear of the censor by
the composer of ideas acts as a substantial deterrent to the creation of new
thoughts.”13 With this, the concept of the chilling effect was born.
1. Chilling Effect and Standing
The Supreme Court later clarified the chilling effect doctrine in the
8. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 74 n.11 (1961) (Warren, J., dissenting)
(citing Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1951)).
Interestingly, the phrase was derived not from prior case opinions, but from an influential law
review article written by Professor Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law School. Freund, supra, at 539.
9. Times Film Corp., 365 U.S. at 74–75.
10. Id. at 74.
11. Id. at 74–75.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 75.
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standing context in Laird v. Tatum.14 Laird stemmed from an Army
surveillance program that collected data and information on localized
political protests to prepare for the Army’s potential role in quelling
civilian unrest.15 The Army began surveillance of protests in 1967—
following riots in Detroit—and voluntarily ceased maintenance of the
data three years later.16 The information was never subsequently used in
furtherance of military initiatives.17 As a result, the Court questioned
whether the plaintiffs, an unidentified class of civilians allegedly
negatively impacted by the pervasive surveillance program, had asserted
a sufficient constitutional injury to maintain standing.18 In resolving that
concern, the Court acknowledged that certain regulations may indeed
create a deterrent, or chilling effect, upon expression that is not explicitly
prohibited by the government.19
Balanced against the Constitution’s standing requirement that a litigant
suffer actual injury,20 the Court found that the notion of speculative chill
was insufficient to constitute concrete, cognizable harm.21 As the Court
observed, “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm.”22 Because the Army had not used the information
in its possession for any reason, the individuals challenging the
surveillance system lacked standing to redress an injury despite their
assertion of a chilling effect arising from the regime.23
The Laird decision contains two important observations about the
chilling effect beyond its essential holding: first, that mere knowledge of
the existence of a speech regulation is insufficient to demonstrate that
speech has actually been chilled,24 and second, that the putative speaker
must be currently or prospectively subject to the regulations he or she is

14. 408 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1972).
15. Id. at 3–8.
16. Id. at 4–5, 7–8.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 11.
20. To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution, a litigant
must demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact that is both concrete and actual or imminent; (2) that the
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s action or inaction; and (3) that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable court decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
21. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 14–16.
24. Id. at 11.
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challenging.25 Thus, from the outset, the Court envisioned the chilling
effect doctrine as containing a heightened knowledge requirement. The
speaker must not merely know that a law exists, but must be correct in his
judgment that his desired speech is actually covered by the law in order
to assert that his chilled expression gives rise to standing.26
In the years since Laird, the chilling effect doctrine has continued to
serve as a gateway to establishing First Amendment standing when
coupled with actual, present harm or the credible threat of future harm.27
In cases involving a threat of real or potential future harm to speech,
courts have continued to require something more than a subjective chill
and have found standing lacking in situations where the plaintiff was not
directly subjected to government action.28 Thus, Laird’s requirement of
chill plus harm remains valid today.
Courts have also created a related, but distinct, standing gateway when
a new regulation curtails speakers’ expression.29 Known as the
anticipatory challenge exception, courts permit speakers to challenge
laws that impinge upon their First Amendment rights in advance of the
law’s application to their expression, or even their assertion of selfimposed chill. In this instance, parties wishing to challenge a statute
before its enforcement need only demonstrate a realistic “danger of
sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or
enforcement.”30 Essentially, speakers are not required to “await the

25. Id.
26. Id. at 11, 13–14.
27. As a representative sample of lower court cases in which the allegation of a chilling effect
was sufficient to bestow constitutional standing, see, for example, Parsons v. United States Dept.
of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 710–17 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that fans of the band Insane Clown Posse
had standing to challenge inclusion of their fan club in federal gang watch list based on allegation
of First Amendment chill); Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235–37 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that
operator of the dietary and nutrition website was sufficiently chilled so as to obtain standing when
contacted by North Carolina Board of Dietetics and Nutrition and advised to bring his website into
compliance with state regulations); and Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082,
1088–90 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that the natural history interest group with history of challenging
ballot initiatives in Utah had standing to challenge the chilling effect imposed by a supermajority
requirement for wildlife initiatives).
28. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14 (noting that “[a]llegations of a subjective chill are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm).
See also Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the student’s claim that he had been chilled in the expression of his views on homosexuality by
school policy prohibiting stigmatizing and insulting comments was too speculative in the absence
of a concrete belief he would be disciplined to support constitutional standing).
29. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342–43 (2014) (holding that
a demonstration of threatened future enforcement of a law is sufficient for Article III standing).
30. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
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consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.”31 In the
context of speech regulations, the threatened injury often comes in the
form of criminal prosecution.32 When contesting the constitutionality of
a criminal statute, however, “it is not necessary that [the plaintiff] first
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge
[the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional
rights.”33
This standard enables a plaintiff to challenge the
constitutionality of a criminal statute without being “required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.”34
The difference between the chilling effect doctrine and an anticipatory
challenge is subtle, but significant. While the chilling effect assesses
standing based on whether the risk of self-censorship is both justifiable
and real, the anticipatory challenge exception focuses instead on whether
the plaintiff has alleged a credible fear of regulation.35 In this regard, the
anticipatory challenge doctrine exerts a lower standing threshold,
requiring only that there exists a realistic fear of prosecution, and not an
actual chill premised on government action.36
In the context of standing, anticipatory challenges demonstrate why
and how requiring something less than outright self-censorship serves to
protect First Amendment free speech rights. Although the chilling effect
doctrine initially served as a gateway to Article III constitutional standing
by equating self-silence with an injury in fact, it is no longer necessary
for a speaker to demonstrate that he or she has censored his or her own
speech to mount a First Amendment lawsuit. A credible fear of
prosecution will now suffice. This weakening of the chilling effect
31. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923), reh’g granted, 263 U.S. 671
(1923).
32. Consider, for example, obscenity laws and parade permit laws that contain criminal
penalties for the presentation of speech. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27–28 (1973)
(holding that no one would be prosecuted “for the sale or exposure of obscene material unless” it
contains “offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct’ defined by state law); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90–91 (1965) (analyzing Alabama’s parade permit procedure in this
seminal case on overbreadth).
33. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974); see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 100
(1968) (noting a case where a teacher was supposed to use a new textbook and teach a condemned
chapter, but to do so would be a criminal offense, therefore she sought a declaration that a statute
was void).
34. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (citing Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)); see Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2346 (holding that a
demonstration of threatened future enforcement of a law is sufficient for Article III standing).
35. For an extended discussion of the role of fear in First Amendment standing, see Brian
Calabrese, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445,
1456–64 (Fall 2011).
36. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11–17 (1972).
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doctrine in the standing context provides a roadmap for why it is time to
abdicate the harm-based concept of chilling effect.
2. Chilling Effect and Harm
Once standing to raise a First Amendment challenge has been
established, courts inquire whether the assumed chill on speech is itself
also an injury.37 Put simply, the very notion that speech is lost or chilled
may itself be a justiciable First Amendment harm separate and apart from
whether a particular party has suffered sufficient injury to raise a claim.38
This form of analysis arises most frequently in facial challenges to a
statute’s potential vagueness or overbreadth. For example, in Grayned v.
City of Rockford—a seminal case on vagueness—the Supreme Court
identified excessive chill as one of the primary constitutional harms
inflicted by ambiguous enactments.39 “[W]here a vague statute ‘abut(s)
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to
inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings inevitably
lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”40 Although the
Court ultimately concluded the antinoise ordinance at issue in Grayned
did not violate the First Amendment, its pronouncement regarding the
danger that vague and overbroad laws will unjustly prohibit speech
remains oft-cited and followed.41
As the Grayned Court noted, it is the uncertainty regarding how a
speech regulation will be applied that creates a basis for self-censorship.
In this vein, the amount of confusion regarding a law’s application to a
particular type of speech is directly proportional to the likelihood that the
speech will be chilled.42 The closer the speech is to a perceived regulated
area, the greater the chances the speaker will silence it, even if it is
actually constitutionally protected and therefore could have been
presented all along.43 Take, for example, a ban on exterior vehicle
37. Calabrese, supra note 35, at 1458–59. See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S.
182, 198–99 (1999) (noting that the challenged badge requirement is injury to the speech itself).
38. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 389 (1988) (“[T]he alleged
danger of [a statute regulating protected expression] is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a
harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution.”).
39. 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
40. Id. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 377 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)).
41. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–13 (1973) (citing Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. at 114–21, in its opinion).
42. Amy Pomerantz Nickerson, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment: Towards a
Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 870–71 (Feb. 2010).
43. Id. at 870.
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advertising that only applies when a car is parked in such a way as to call
attention to it.44 Without a definition as to when this occurs or what
criteria a law enforcement officer is to use in determining the intent of
the driver in parking the car, the law could be used to target nearly any
exterior advertising on cars.45 When faced with such an ordinance,
reasonable people may elect not to display advertising at all, on the
grounds that they may face prosecution every time they park their
vehicles. Thus, in cases challenging the ambiguity of statutory terms, the
chilling effect concept actually serves as a basis for invalidating the law,
because it indirectly discourages speech.
The notion of chill occupies a related, but subtly different place in the
overbreadth doctrine.46 Claims that a legislative enactment is overly
broad do not necessarily assert that speakers are subject to a justifiable,
self-imposed chill, but rather imply that the law itself actually chills
protected expression by directly regulating it.47 The difference between
vagueness and overbreadth therefore lies in the entity imposing the chill:
in void for vagueness cases, the concern is for a self-censorship; in
overbreadth cases, the concern is for a chill arising from the terms of the
statute. The Court’s opinion in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, for example, emphasizes this exact point.48
In Taxpayers for Vincent, the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated that a statute is only overbroad if it “inhibit[s] the speech
of third parties who are not before the court,” and, even then, only where
it “unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct.”49 In short,
for a plaintiff to challenge a statute on an overbreadth basis, there must
be a recognized and realistic danger that the statute itself will impair First
Amendment protections.50
In any event, when courts that assess the facial validity of statutes
impacting speech consider the possibility of a chilling effect, these courts
are weighing whether the quantum of hypothetically suppressed
expression is sufficient to strike down the law. Regardless of whether the
chill arises from a speaker’s own choice or the terms of the challenged
44. See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638–40 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing vagueness
of ordinance restricting advertising on parked vehicles).
45. Id. at 639.
46. See supra note 4 (defining the overbreadth doctrine).
47. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (“[T]he threat of enforcement of an
overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the
overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.”).
48. 466 U.S. 789, 800–01 (1984).
49. Id. at 800 n.19.
50. Id. at 801; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (noting that the harm must be
a result of the executive or legislative action).
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enactment, the notion that some speech might not exist because of
governmental overreaching constitutes a cognizable, constitutional harm.
B. Current Doctrinal Approaches to Chilling Effect
While Laird, Grayned, and their progeny are useful when
conceptualizing the chilling effect doctrine in situations where either
standing or constitutional harm is at issue, a review of recent appellate
cases from the prior decade is instructive—especially when assessing
how courts apply chilling effect in a broader sense. Although chilling
effect is used to assess speech across a variety of spectrums, speech that
is presented by extremely favored speakers on one end of the spectrum—
as in, contributors to political candidates—and extremely disfavored
speakers on the opposite end—as in, prisoners and targets of government
investigations—tend to trigger the doctrine more frequently. An
assessment of recent decisions in these contexts generates important
observations about how the courts interpret and make use of the chilling
effect doctrine.
1. Prisoner Speech Cases
In the context of speech promulgated by inmates in confinement,
courts have specifically engrafted a chilling effect requirement into the
substantive First Amendment doctrine.51 In other words, chilling effect
is used not merely as a basis for finding standing or as one measure
among many for constitutional injury, but it is affirmatively required as
an element of asserting a prima facie First Amendment violation.52
This is particularly true where speech by prisoners forms the basis of
a claim of retaliation, or when an inmate alleges that the content of his or
her expression has generated an adverse response by prison officials.53
Using this test, courts have rejected constitutional challenges to prison
51. See, e.g., Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (holding that
the inmate challenging mail restrictions must demonstrate that his speech was chilled to show a
constitutional violation).
52. See, e.g., Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a viable claim
of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took
some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) the inmate’s protected conduct and that
the adverse action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and (5) did not
reasonably advance a legitimate penological purpose); Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding that to establish a claim of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must prove
(1) that he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused
the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a
response to the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct).
53. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269.
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transfers following an inmate’s exercise of his or her free speech rights54
and to restrictions on sending mail between inmates of different penal
institutions.55 Nevertheless, even though chilling effect is elevated to a
substantive requirement, courts do not require inmates to demonstrate a
complete and total chill on their speech to state a First Amendment case.56
Rather, courts focus on whether an ordinary person of reasonable
firmness would be chilled by the alleged retaliation instead of whether
the particular inmate was, in fact, chilled.57 Thus, while chilling effect is
an affirmative element of proving a constitutional violation for inmates,
the test is an objective, rather than a subjective, one.58
2. Government Surveillance Cases
Constitutional challenges to governmental surveillance programs also
provide a strong illustration of how the chilling effect doctrine is used in
practice. For example, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the
Supreme Court imposed a heightened chilling effect standard on cases
involving government surveillance programs.59 Various individuals,
lawyers, and human rights organizations brought suit in Clapper to enjoin
enforcement of the foreign persons surveillance provisions in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).60 These individuals alleged that,
because they feared surveillance under FISA, they were required to
undertake expensive, burdensome, and time-consuming measures to
conceal their innocuous and routine communications from the
government.61 The Supreme Court rejected this allegation and held that
this sort of self-concealment was insufficient to confer standing based on
the chill concept—finding, instead, that the individuals themselves
devised the concealment plans; FISA did not require them.62 In so doing,
the Court reiterated that a subjective fear, even one that is legitimate and
“nonparanoid,” is insufficient to confer standing based on chilling effect

54. Hurd v. Garcia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1048 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
55. Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179, 1183 (4th Cir. 1986).
56. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 562, 568 (9th Cir. 2004) (amending Rhodes v. Robinson,
380 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2004)).
57. Pena v. Greffet, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1223 (D. N.M. 2013).
58. Id.
59. Clapper v. Amnesty Intern’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013). For a comprehensive
treatment of standing concepts in government surveillance cases, including the role of chilling
effect in establishing both standing to sue and redressable injury, see Scott Michelman, Who Can
Sue Over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71 (2009).
60. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1140.
61. Id. at 1150–51.
62. Id. at 1151.
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in surveillance cases.63
The Clapper Court implied that there must be some nexus between the
government’s regulation and the chilling effect itself; in other words, the
government must impose the chill, not the speaker.64 Further, the
government action must be the cause of the chill, such that if the incentive
to silence oneself existed before the challenged enactment, standing
ceases to exist.65 Because the speakers in Clapper could not demonstrate
that their concealment efforts arose because of FISA in some way, they
lacked standing to attack FISA’s foreign surveillance provisions.66
In the wake of Clapper, lower courts have interpreted the decision to
require not merely a possible chilling effect on communication, but
instead a “certain impending injury” (i.e., an injury that will definitely
occur in a very short period of time) to establish constitutional standing.67
Although the Clapper opinion arose from a challenge to a governmental
surveillance program, some courts have extended the “certain impending
injury” requirement to more general First Amendment litigation.68 But it
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court agrees with this extension
of the certain injury principle.69 For the time being, Clapper implies that
pre-enforcement challenges to speech-related laws will be less successful
in the absence of a certain and imminent threat of prosecution.70
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1152.
66. Id. at 1152–53.
67. See, e.g., Citizen Center v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900, 910 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge vote-tracking procedure because plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that individuals would not vote if they knew their votes were being traced).
68. See, e.g., Afifi v. Lynch, 101 F. Supp. 3d 90, 108–09 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that selfinflicted injury does not confer standing); Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Brownback,
110 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1102–03 (D. Kan. 2015) (dismissing lawsuit challenging Kansas Second
Amendment Act on grounds that anti-gun violence organization did not allege actual or certain
injury arising from the law); Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 71 F. Supp. 3d 155, 162–63 (D.D.C.
2014) (dismissing facial challenge to Washington D.C. law, which made it a crime to falsely deny
ownership of an animal, on grounds that animal rights activist who disclaimed pets as property
faced either certain impending injury or a reasonable belief he would be subjected to prosecution);
but see Fikre v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1164 (D. Or. 2015) (finding
that a naturalized citizen of Eritrean descent had standing to challenge his placement on the FBI’s
no-fly list).
69. There exists a current split of authority amongst the lower courts on whether Clapper’s
heightened standing requirement applies solely to surveillance programs, where national security
may be at issue, or instead applies more generally to all cases in which standing is premised upon
a chilling effect on speech. Compare supra note 59 (discussing the Clapper decision) with Const.
Party of Penn. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 371–72 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that Clapper is limited to
surveillance programs and finding, in light of that narrow reading of Clapper, that non-major
political parties had standing to challenge ballot access laws).
70. Clapper v. Amnesty Intern’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152–53 (2013).
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3. Election Law Cases
In the context of governmental action to expose campaign
communications and other election-related speech, courts have made use
of the chilling effect concept not only to support determinations that
constitutional standing and constitutional harm exist, but also to justify
extending discretionary jurisdiction to adjudicate speech interests.71 For
example, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the Ninth Circuit issued an order
blocking the discovery of internal campaign communications related to
the same-sex marriage debate, despite questioning whether the remedy
was legally appropriate.72 It did so in large part based upon the chilling
effect that disclosure of campaign communications would have on future
political participation.73
In other cases, courts have assumed—without much discussion—that
limits on campaign contributions impose a chilling effect on donors’
willingness to contribute.74 For example, in Seaton v. Wiener, the court
made a blanket finding that “[t]he return of ‘excess’ donor contributions,
however, has a chilling effect on speech and burdens the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms,” absent any discussion of how realistic or
concrete the chilling effect was.75 Thus, in the election law context,
courts essentially appear to presume chilling effect and ascertain the
law’s potential impact without proof to demonstrate that the regulation,
in theory, deters expression.76
Comparing the use of chilling effect in prisoner, surveillance, and
election law cases produces three significant observations about the
doctrine itself. First, when it is used to demonstrate constitutional
standing to challenge a speech-related regulation, the standard for
demonstrating chilling effect remains quite high. Particularly when the
Clapper “certain impending injury” test is used, the chilling effect
71. See, e.g., Iowa Right to Life, Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 594–601 (8th Cir. 2013)
(invalidating, under the First Amendment, portions of Iowa campaign finance law requiring
corporations to limit contributions to political candidates and comply with ongoing reporting
requirements about its contributions and intent).
72. 591 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2009).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., SpeechNow.Org v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 693–96 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that statutory contribution limits violate the First Amendment because it prevented
plaintiffs from donating in excess of proscribed limits).
75. 22 F. Supp. 3d 945, 949 (D. Minn. 2009). See also Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616
F.3d 213, 243 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding, without analysis, that chilling effect justified standing to
state campaign finance reform law).
76. SpeechNow.Org, 599 F.3d at 695 (focusing First Amendment analysis on whether the
government retained a substantial interest in limiting campaign contributions without discussing
whether or how the restriction deterred speech).
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doctrine requires plaintiffs to be mind readers or fortune tellers.77 In few
other realms of law does a case rise or fall based solely on predictions of
the future, making the chilling effect doctrine an outlier in its reliance
upon future events to dictate present outcomes.78
Second, although no court has explicitly said so, the invocation of the
chilling effect concept appears tethered in some way to the strength of the
First Amendment right being asserted. Where the right of free speech is
strong—for example, in election law cases involving the right of political
expression—chilling effect is almost always presumed.79 In such cases,
plaintiffs challenging restrictions on their speech need not demonstrate
that their speech or others’ speech has actually been chilled to prevail.80
And third, where the First Amendment right is less defined—like in
prisoner or surveillance cases—the standard of proof required to
demonstrate a sufficient chilling effect is quite demanding.81 As such, in
practice, the chilling effect concept is both fluid and dependent on
context, making it difficult to apply and even harder to understand.
C. Scholarly Response to the Chilling Effect Doctrine
The chilling effect doctrine occupies an important place in First
Amendment jurisprudence because it both defines the threshold for
adjudicating speech-related interests and also quantifies when a law that
burdens expression is constitutionally intolerable. Yet, in recent
literature, scholars have addressed the chilling effect doctrine only in
relation to other aspects of constitutional law without fully contemplating
its role as a stand-alone doctrine. Over the past two decades, at least four
schools of thought have emerged on the normative role that chilling effect
ought to play in conceptualizing the free speech clause.
One school of thought, which encompasses constitutional law scholars
who favor bright-line, categorical approaches to regulating expression,
77. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (discussing the Clapper decision).
78. In contrast, compare the “certain impending injury” test with FED. R. EVID. 407, which
specifically excludes subsequent remedial measures, as evidence of wrongdoing in products
liability cases, or to the myriad of state jury instructions that prevent juries from considering
possible future sentences in adjudicating guilt in criminal cases. See, e.g., City of Parma Heights
v. Dingman, No. 70769, 1997 WL 218259, at *6–7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997) (discussing jury
instructions).
79. See, e.g., Seaton, 22 F. Supp. 3d at 947–48 (discussing how plaintiffs identified “various
ways in which the statute at issue [had] previously restrained, or currently “chill[ed],” his or her
First Amendment freedoms”).
80. See, e.g., SpeechNow.Org, 599 F.3d at 693–96 (withholding discussion on whether or how
the contested statute actually restricted speech).
81. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Intern’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152–53 (2013) (holding that
“a subjective fear of surveillance does not give rise to standing”).
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has criticized the chilling effect test on the basis that it is speculative and
difficult to apply.82 This perspective, led by Frederick Schauer, stops
short of advocating for the abandonment of the standard, but nonetheless
notes that this practice is prone to error because it cannot be empirically
measured.83 In Schauer’s view, the chilling effect doctrine embodies a
normative rule that the overdeterrence of protected speech generates a
more severe harm than the extension of speech rights to expression that
should not be protected.84 Treated as such, Schauer argues that the
chilling effect doctrine actually reinforces the exclusion of valueless
speech from First Amendment protection.85 To reach this conclusion,
Schauer makes a number of logical leaps to support this assertion. First,
he argues that under the chilling effect doctrine, laws that contain vague
or ambiguous terms are unconstitutional because they may unnecessarily
deter protected speech.86 Second, and as a result, legislatures must work
to draft speech-related laws with greater categorical precision,
particularly where—as in the case of obscenity—the underlying
regulated speech is unprotected.87 Thus, under Schauer’s analysis, the
chilling effect forces the creation of category-based restrictions on
speech—favoring a normative outcome.88
Schauer’s view may have some merit in terms of normative value, but
it constitutes an incomplete treatment of chilling effect. Although
Schauer thoughtfully examines the incentives and outcomes generated by
a consideration of the possible chilling effect of a statute, his analysis
82. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (leading the first school of thought). Schauer’s article
was the first to fully examine the concept of chilling effect and is therefore often cited as the seminal
authority on the topic. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 888 (2000). For additional critiques of the speculative nature of
the chilling effect doctrine, see, for example, Bertrall L. Ross, Paths of Resistance to Our Imperial
First Amendment, 113 MICH. L. REV. 917, 937 (2015) (“The Court has consistently invoked []
chilling effects to justify rejecting blurry standards and empirical judgments in favor of sharper,
categorical rules that privilege speech rights.”); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 155 (2007) (“Determining the existence of a chilling effect is
complicated by the difficulty of defining and identifying deterrence. It is hard to measure the
deterrence caused by a chilling effect because it is impossible to determine with certainty what
people would have said or done in the absence of the government activity.”). The Supreme Court,
too, has acknowledged that the chilling effect doctrine is merely a prediction about how speakers
will behave and that, at some point, courts may lack confidence in its assumptions. Broaderick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
83. Schauer, supra note 82, at 694–95.
84. Id. at 688.
85. Id. at 690.
86. Id. at 704.
87. Id. at 690, 704.
88. Id. at 704.
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wholly fails to justify—or even consider—why nonexistent speech
should be factored into First Amendment analysis in the first place.89
Schauer, at most, argues in favor of the results of the doctrine and not
necessarily in favor of the concept itself.90
First Amendment scholars that advocate against governmental
regulation of speech, and in favor of an open marketplace of ideas,
represent a second school of thought on the opposite end of the spectrum
as Schauer.91 These scholars tend to support the notion that the chill
concept is harmful, but forego a robust analysis into whether, and how,
the chilling effect actually protects speech.92 For example, recognized
privacy expert Neil Richards agrees with Schauer’s hypothesis that it is
better, from a normative perspective, to overextend First Amendment
protection to speech that should not be covered than to overdeter valued
speech.93 But, Richards disagrees with the notion that chilling effect
supports categorical regulation of expression.94 Richards instead argues
for expansion of the chilling effect doctrine to create fear-based standing
in intellectual privacy cases where individual speech and association are
subject to governmental review.95 He does so by proposing a balancing
test that weighs the right of free speech against the government’s interest
in observing, recording, and cataloging communication.96
Yet, Richards fails to explain how expanding the chilling effect
doctrine would best serve to protect speech that is presently subject to
covert surveillance and, in fact, concedes that individual determinations
of whether speech is actually chilled will not be easy under his proposed
framework.97 Amy Pomerantz Nickerson argues, in line with Richards,
that recognizing chill as a harm protects the underlying value of freedom
of expression, but she fails to point to an example where the chilling
effect doctrine saved such speech.98
89. Id. at 690–704.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Amy Pomerantz Nickerson, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment:
Towards a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 869– 72 (Feb. 2010)
(likening chilling effect to the concept of overdeterrence in criminal law and arguing that the
concept of chill itself constitutes harm, in that an idea that has normative value and would otherwise
be expressed is permanently silenced).
92. Id.
93. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1964 (2013).
94. Id.
95. Id. (discussing fear-based standing). For further discussion of fear-based standing, see Part
I.A.1.
96. Richards, supra note 93, at 1964.
97. Id.
98. Pomerantz Nickerson, supra note 91, at 869–70.
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For Richards and Pomerantz Nickerson, the chilling effect protects the
ideas of speech and privacy, not the regulated communications
themselves. As such, both scholars view the doctrine through an
outcome-determinative lens, desiring to save solely the speech they view
as having normative value. In an earlier article, Fred Zacharias actually
predicted this problem by observing that the chilling effect doctrine fails
to distinguish, in either type or degree, the speech that the doctrine
chills.99 Thus, the concept leaves open the possibility for normative
disagreement as to when courts should care that categories of speech
(e.g., obscenity, defamation, or political expression) may be restricted in
advance—yet another flaw with the chilling effect doctrine.100
Led by Christopher Slobogin, another school of thought has argued
that the type of self-censorship embodied in the chilling effect doctrine
arises from individual choice—not government action—and that
speakers must wait until they have experienced a concrete First
Amendment injury to sue.101 Slobogin draws upon the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Clapper for support: “[R]espondents cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”102 Under this
view, all self-imposed censorship constitutes the “subjective chill”
warned against in Laird, unless the speaker is facing imminent and certain
governmental action against his expression.103 Slobogin’s theory, then,
is that the chilling effect doctrine is too expansive to be valid because it
permits speech to be considered by the court far in advance of a justiciable
controversy.
Slobogin’s approach is fundamentally flawed to the extent that his
critique actually proves the existence of the chilling effect he disputes.
To inflict harm on one’s self, there must be some harm to actually inflict,
and Slobogin’s analysis implies this without expressly acknowledging
the implications of this assumption. Rather than taking issue with the

99. Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936, 990
(1987).
100. Id.
101. Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 542–43
(2015). Although Slobogin’s points relate solely to political speech that is censored based on the
existence of secret national security surveillance programs, his point is relevant to any speech that
may be subjected to self-censorship. See also Matthew A. Wasserman, First Amendment
Limitations on Police Surveillance: The Case of the Muslim Surveillance Program, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1786, 1795 (2015) (“This chilling effect is, at least to a large degree, a self-inflicted injury.
But its self-inflicted nature makes it no less damaging.”).
102. Slobogin, supra note 101, at 542 n.138 (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151).
103. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
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concept of chill generally, Slobogin instead focuses on the party imposing
the chill and argues that only censorship directly imposed by the
government rises to the level of a constitutional violation.104 This
analysis is particularly unsatisfying because it implicitly identifies the
distinct possibility of self-censorship, but then dismisses that factor in
determining constitutional standing.
Still other academics, primary among them Leslie Kendrick, have
argued that the chilling effect doctrine is faulty because it fails to embody
the notion of a putative speaker’s intent that is so integral to the dividing
line between protected and unprotected expression.105 In Kendrick’s
view, the primary flaw with the doctrine is its inability to perfectly
include speech in the gray areas entitled to “breathing space,”106 and it
instead excludes speech that is unprotected because of its lack of
constitutional value.107 Like Schauer, Kendrick believes that the chilling
effect doctrine serves to reinforce preexisting rules regarding the type of
speech that is protected by the First Amendment and the type of speech
that is not.108 But Kendrick focuses solely on the deterrence of bad
motives by speakers and not by the content of the speech itself.109
The resulting First Amendment landscape is highly fractured. The
legal academy seems uniform in its belief that the chilling effect doctrine
is imperfect at best, but has failed to generate any consistent view on why
that is. This Article fills a void in the literature by examining in detail the
numerous faulty assumptions upon which the chilling effect doctrine
rests.
II. THE FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE CHILLING EFFECT
When faced with a law banning or restricting free speech in some way,
affected speakers have multiple options, only one of which is selfcensorship. With regard to chilling effect, it is true that a person may
elect to keep his or her mouth shut rather than face the risk that he or she
will be a target of governmental intervention. A well-meaning and
trusting person may also assume that if the government has foreclosed his
104. Slobogin, supra note 101, at 543.
105. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and The Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633
(Apr. 2013). Kendrick also criticizes the chilling effect doctrine on the ground that it lacks
empirical support and calls for more robust social science in the field of self-censorship.
106. Kendrick, supra note 105, at 1637. As Kendrick observes, courts have utilized the term
“breathing space” to mean the absence of a chilling effect—in other words, a space in which speech
can exist without being regulated. Id.
107. Id. at 1636–39. See also Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) (“It has
long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space . . . .”).
108. Kendrick, supra note 105, at 1636–39.
109. Id.
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or her speech, he or she ought not to have said it all along, and he or she
may self-censor out of a sense of duty to follow the law. Speakers may
also impose a chilling effect on themselves after conducting a balancing
test; perhaps the speech they wish to utter is not all that important to them,
and perhaps the public’s interest in suppressing the speech is stronger
than the individual motive in saying it. Individuals may therefore arrive
at a place of self-chill for a variety of reasons and based upon wideranging and diverse sets of values, not all of which are against free
speech.
But, it is equally possible that persons wishing to exercise their right
of free expression will not tolerate oppressive outcomes. A person, for
example, may choose to speak even in the face of governmental
regulation and assume the risk that he or she might be prosecuted for his
or her speech or sued by the government to enjoin it. If he or she chooses
this option, there is the possibility that the government will seek redress,
but it is also possible that the government will ignore the speaker’s
expression or forego its legal remedies. In the event that the speaker
continues to speak without governmental intervention, his or her civil
disobedience emboldens others to similarly speak against the law, thus
increasing the likelihood that similar speakers will also forego selfcensorship.
One strategy, then, to defeat any theoretical chilling effect imposed by
governmental regulation is to flood the speech marketplace with the exact
type of speech the government forbids—thereby decreasing the
likelihood that the government will be able to prohibit, prosecute, or
eliminate speech of its kind. In this way, overcoming the chilling effect
can be contagious, and the chill dissipates as the speech proliferates.
A speaker may also opt to file his own preemptive lawsuit, arguing that
he or she has a reasonable fear of government redress to justify his or her
anticipatory challenge. Here, too, he or she is taking a risk that he or she
will lose the court case and forfeit an opportunity to offer the speech, but
the speaker is in the process of eliminating the possibility that he or she
will be prosecuted or forced to defend his or her speech in court. In
addition, the speaker may also lobby his or her elected representatives
and engage in public debate designed to alter or repeal the speech-related
law. As such, self-censorship is not a necessary outcome of
governmental regulation of speech, but is merely one possible reaction
putative speakers may have when faced with restrictions on their desired
expression. Chilling effect is therefore far from a necessary component
of free speech. In fact, chilling effect constitutes only one narrow subset
of the possible outcomes of a speech regulation.
To accept that a person would engage in self-censorship, one must
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accept at least three logical assumptions: (1) that the person is aware of a
law that prohibits or restricts speech; (2) that the person correctly
understands how the law applies to his desired speech; and (3) that the
person is willing to conform his or her behavior to the regulation, rather
than speaking and thus risking government retaliation or availing himself
or herself of other legal and legislative remedies. As will be discussed
below, each of these assumptions lacks justification in law or fact. Thus,
at its roots, the chilling effect doctrine is premised upon unsupportable
conjecture.
A. Knowledge of the Law
The notion that putative speakers are aware of the laws governing their
expression is embedded within the concept of the chilling effect.110 In
this regard, any subjective chill necessarily begins with an understanding
of the myriad forms of legislation that may impact speech. From federal
criminal law to local municipal ordinances, and from state licensing
requirements to content-based administrative regulations, there are
numerous laws that may directly or indirectly burden expression. To
have an understanding of whether a person’s speech is lawful, the speaker
must first be aware of all sources’ restrictions on his or her message. In
other words, the chilling effect doctrine embodies how a speaker will
educate himself or herself about all possible laws regulating speech
before deciding whether to present his or her message.
The nature of modern communication—where people’s expressive
lives are lived partially online and partially in real time—supports a
context-based approach to the knowledge inquiry. While it is true that
the Internet facilitates a large dissemination of people’s information,
obtaining the requisite knowledge of the law can prove insurmountable
in real-life situations.111
Take, for example, the case of the suburban housewife who, having
made a sizeable contribution to her cousin’s school board campaign,
stakes a sign in her front yard to demonstrate her support. Would such a
speaker be aware that, as election speech, federal election law would
govern her contribution?112 Would she be aware of the intricacies of the
110. The Supreme Court admitted as much in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11–17 (1972).
111. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (noting that cell phones “are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they
were an important feature of human anatomy”); Reno v. Amer. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850–51
(1997) (describing the architecture and capabilities of the internet).
112. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (citing
limitations on contributions to political campaigns imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
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Federal Elections Commission’s regulations on campaign speech?
Would she even have access to local ordinances regulating the size and
color of her yard sign and the time period during which she could display
it?113 Would she further be aware that she could report her donation to
the local elections board on an itemized expense report? 114 How would
this housewife know to seek out what the law says if she is wholly
unaware that the law even regulates her expression? These questions
demonstrate the knowledge gap that is likely to exist between a speaker’s
desired expression and the panoply of laws that potentially regulate it.
Consider, further, the plight of an inner-city minister who organizes an
impromptu prayer gathering at the site of a violent shooting. Would the
minister be aware of the need for a parade permit under his local city
ordinance?115 Would he know that the law prohibits blocking the
sidewalk or that the park board requires all parks to close after dark?116
How would the minister acquire this knowledge in the midst of a tragic
situation that demands an immediate response? Again, the example
demonstrates how an individual person is likely uninformed about the
laws that govern his or her speech.
While these situations may, in some sense, seem cliché, they exemplify
the very real likelihood that most speakers have little understanding of
the laws that regulate their expression. In fact, as regulation of speech
expands across jurisdictions, the likelihood decreases that individuals
will be aware of the diverse range of laws governing their conduct.
Contrast these scenarios with the minefield of online communication,
in which awareness of regulated speech seems almost ubiquitous. Highprofile security breaches to data systems at Target and Home Depot, to
name a few, and Edward Snowden’s leak of the federal government’s
113. See, e.g., Dimas v. City of Warren, 939 F. Supp. 554, 557–58 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (striking
a city ordinance which prohibited property owners from posting political yard signs within fortyfive days prior to any election).
114. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.08 (West 2005) (mandating that reports of
campaign finance activity be filed with the Secretary of State). Campaign finance reports lodged
with
the
Secretary
of
State
in
Ohio
can
be
found
at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/CampaignFinance/Search.aspx.
115. The City of Birmingham, Alabama’s parade permit procedure was the subject of the
Supreme Court’s seminal case on overbreadth, Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 148. Although the
ordinance on the books at the time was declared unconstitutional, the City of Birmingham to this
day requires a permit to conduct a parade, display, or public gathering. Instructions for Parade
Permit
Applications,
http://www.birminghamal.gov/download/traffic_engineering/PARADE%20PERMIT%20APPLI
CATIONS.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
116. See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE, § 1703-9 (2012) (noting Park Board Rule
21, which proscribes evening closing times for municipal public parks).
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massive digital surveillance program have raised popular awareness that
almost all digital communication is potentially subject to disclosure.117
In their groundbreaking article, Free Speech, Anupam Chander and Uyen
Le make a compelling case that, because online privacy is all but
eviscerated, “the chilling effect has already arrived.”118 Because
individuals now believe that the government regulates every text, email,
and social media post through a lens, these individuals already have
knowledge that their expression is subject to potentially limitless
surveillance and disclosure.119
But the general understanding that the government might watch
people’s digital lives does not support the chilling effect doctrine’s
assumption that speakers are aware of all regulations governing their
speech. Merely because people generally recognize that their social
media posts and text messages might be later used against them, they are
not necessarily cognizant of the vast legal restrictions that apply to online
communication.120 While people might have some understanding that
their digital exchanges are not wholly private, there is often a lack of the
means and sophistication to determine all the possible laws that these
individuals will need to navigate to engage in lawful expression.
Moreover, as was the case in Laird, the government may compile and
categorize individuals’ communication without ever using it against
them, thereby reducing the likelihood that they will become aware of the
117. Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Cards Breach Bigger than Target’s, WALL ST. J.
(Sept.
18,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets1411073571; Robin Sidel, Target to Settle Claims over Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/target-reaches-settlement-with-visa-over-2013-data-breach1439912013; Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964.
118. Anupam Chander & Uyen Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 546 (2015).
119. Id. at 546–47. The view that individuals are aware they are subject to digital surveillance
is not universally accepted. See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96
IOWA L. REV. 581 (Jan. 2011) (noting that people are generally unaware that their cell phones can
be tracked). For example, Matthew Tokson points out that people are generally unaware that their
cell phones are routinely subjected to geographic tracking. Tokson also argues that judicial
understanding of what people know and do not know about government surveillance serves as an
improper measure of their reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The argument is equally persuasive here, where knowledge of government regulation on speech
may be lacking in individual cases.
120. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2009) (punishing hate crimes of violence based upon express
or implied discriminatory intent); 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2006) (mandating record-keeping and labeling
for all digital depictions of actual sexual conduct, including images and videos exchanged between
consenting adults in private). As I have highlighted in other work, the general public lacks
awareness of the complex federal regime regulating and in some situations criminalizing private
adult sexting. Jennifer M. Kinsley, First Amendment Sexual Privacy: Adult Sexting and Federal
Age-Verification Legislation, 45 N.M. L. REV. 1, 35 (2014).
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surveillance scheme in the first place.121 Essentially, knowledge that
particular consequences may flow from speech does not constitute the
same knowledge that regulations preclude speech at its inception. As a
result, it is a fallacy to assume, as the chilling effect doctrine does, that
speakers—either online or in person—will always know the law.
Those who disagree will likely point to the fact that knowledge of the
law is presumed in other contexts. It is true, for instance, that an
individual accused of a crime cannot mount a defense on the basis that he
was not aware of the law.122 Indeed, the entire criminal code is premised
upon the notion that people will educate themselves about what the law
forbids and adjust their conduct accordingly. Yet, the vast majority of
criminal law regulates conduct that individuals have no constitutional
right to undertake. There is no legitimate legal right to speed down the
highway, to engage in a bar-room brawl, or to sexually assault a
classmate. In these instances, imposing a theoretical obligation on an
individual to investigate and know the law before engaging in unlawful
conduct places no real burden on the individual exercising a protected
right.
This is untrue, though, in the context of free speech, where a
fundamental right is always at stake.123 It imposes an improper burden
on speakers to assume that they will seek out the existence of laws
governing their messages and maintain up-to-date knowledge of all
federal, state, and local regulations on speech to justify their speech
before it is even presented. In this way, the knowledge assumption
actually turns the First Amendment on its head. By engrafting the
requirement that speakers educate themselves about the existence of the
law in advance of speaking, the chilling effect doctrine imposes a form
of prior restraint—to paraphrase the old adage: learn before you leap.124
In this regard, the knowledge assumption embedded within the chilling
effect doctrine actually works against the free speech protections it is

121. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 7–8. (1972).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971)
(“[I]gnorance of the law is no defense.”).
123. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“Freedom of speech and of the press
are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”).
124. This view of the knowledge assumption comports with Blackstone’s initial description of
prior restraints, which advocated that speech should occur unrestricted and that consequences could
only flow from existing speech, not suppressed speech.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *151–52. (“Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.”).
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intended to serve.
B. Knowledge of How the Law Applies
It is one thing to know that a law exists; it is quite a different thing to
know that a law applies to hypothetical expression. Understanding how
a particular speech regulation might apply to proposed speech that does
not exist yet can be a murky inquiry. Indeed, laws regulating speech are
often imprecise and fail to identify the exact universe of expression they
are intended to cover.125 Some scholars have labeled this “breathing
space” as a necessary evil; when laws do not clearly apply to speech of
marginal or questionable First Amendment validity, they embody the
constitutional preference for free speech rather than silenced speech.126
The resulting ambiguity, though, can make it difficult for putative
speakers to understand the way in which their speech is impacted.
A speaker is not without options for investigating the application of
law to his message. For example, an individual can speculate as to how
a law will be interpreted prospectively by reviewing prior judgments to
determine the bounds of the law’s application. Studying prior cases in
this way can lead to more informed judgments, but a full understanding
of the law’s nuances often requires a lawyer’s, and not a layperson’s,
interpretation.127 Not all would-be speakers maintain the resources or
wherewithal to incur the costs of legal representation to convey a
message.128 And, even when a speaker consults a lawyer to provide an
educated guess about a particular law’s application, the lawyer might still
guess incorrectly.129 As another option, a speaker might seek a
declaration from the courts as to whether his or her speech is covered by
125. This problem arises more acutely in cases of vagueness, where a regulation does not
contain sufficient definitions or guidelines to adequately convey what type of speech is impacted,
see, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), but it can also occur when a
regulation is so broad that it appears to target all possible speech of a particular variety or
originating from a particular speaker. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258
(2002) (striking down portions of Child Pornography Prevention Act that would have criminalized
legitimate works of art and science involving teenage sexuality as substantially overbroad).
126. Kendrick, supra note 105, at 1637.
127. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (noting that the
law does not require speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney).
128. Ross, supra note 82, at 937.
129. For example, First Amendment lawyer Paul Cambria generated what has come to be
known as “the Cambria list” to apprise his clients of material likely to be found obscene. The list
includes depictions that have been expressly acquitted in some jurisdictions, meaning that, at least
with regard to certain sexually explicit content, Cambria guessed incorrectly about the application
of
law
to
speech.
See
Frontline,
Prosecuting
Obscenity,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/prosecuting/cambria.html (last visited Dec.
19, 2016).
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a particular regulation—but this proposition is often expensive, timeconsuming, and risky.130 Alternatively, a speaker could ask the
government if it intends to target his or her speech, in effect asking for an
advisory opinion before either speaking or litigating.131 Faced with these
less-than-ideal choices, the chilling effect doctrine assumes that speakers
will necessarily conclude that their speech is at risk of known speech
regulations that target it.
Unfortunately, this too is a false assumption. The sheer volume of
criminal cases premised upon speech suggests that speakers who are
unaware of a law’s application to them nevertheless tend to put forth
expression in an undaunted and unedited way. 132 There is no risk of a
shortage of expression in today’s age of social media, where anyone with
a cell phone and an Internet connection is an instant journalist.
Moreover, First Amendment jurisprudence conflicts with the chilling
effect’s treatment of knowledge. On the one hand, the chilling effect
assumes that speakers know that a law applies to their speech—or they
130. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (observing that case-by-case litigation as to
the application of overly broad laws to speech imposes both a “burden” and a “risk” on speakers).
131. Because it resembles a prior restraint in both process and outcome, this approach is
particularly problematic from a constitutional standpoint. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 60 (1965) (striking down legislation that required advanced approval from a government
commission in order to publicly exhibit motion pictures on the grounds that it improperly imposed
a prior restraint). Courts have also been reluctant to accept government representations that it will
not prosecute certain forms of speech that are clearly covered by a challenged law on the basis that
the government is fluid and not bound by the current administration’s executive decision-making.
For example, Judge Sloviter had the following observation about the government’s interpretation
of the Communication Decency Act:
The government makes yet another argument that troubles me. It suggests that the
concerns expressed by the plaintiffs and the questions posed by the court reflect an
exaggerated supposition of how it would apply the law, and that we should, in effect,
trust the Department of Justice to limit the CDA’s application in a reasonable fashion
that would avoid prosecution for placing on the Internet works of serious literary or
artistic merit. That would require a broad trust indeed from a generation of judges not
far removed from the attacks on James Joyce’s Ulysses as obscene.
132. There have been many high-profile prosecutions of online posts in recent years, including,
for example, misdemeanor charges against a suburban mother who created a fake MySpace page
to ridicule a child who ultimately committed suicide. Scott Michels, Neighbor Guilty in MySpace
Hoax
Case,
ABC
NEWS
(Nov.
26,
2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Technology/story?id=6338498. Even the Supreme Court has
considered a criminal case arising from the posting of online expression. See Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). But perhaps the best example of the principle that speech exists
even in the face of laws banning it can be found in the Michigan vulgarity law, which—until its
repeal is effective on March 14, 2016—states: “Any person who shall use any indecent, immoral,
obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the presence or hearing of any woman or child shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.” Mich. Pen. Code 750.337 (1931). It is highly likely, based on reasonable
social norms and expectations and the realities of human interaction, that this law is violated on a
daily basis in Michigan.
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make an incorrect guess that it does. Absent this assumption, a chill will
not result because the speaker would not be aware of the need for selfsilencing. But recent Supreme Court case law suggests the opposite
conclusion.133 As the Court’s Citizens United decision demonstrates,
speech regulations that require outside research or expert opinions
generate an unjustifiable burden on expression, regardless of whether a
chill exists.134 In essence, the chilling effect doctrine assumes that
speakers will undertake the appropriate inquiry to understand how the
law applies to them, while prevailing First Amendment jurisprudence
reaches the exact opposite conclusion.
There exists a further wrinkle in how the chilling effect concept
anticipates knowledge with respect to third-party censors. In certain
contexts (i.e., newspapers and online comment features), intermediaries
provide opportunities for speakers to engage in a particular type of speech
without directly speaking. It is the unfortunate reality that regulatory
speech laws may also encourage these types of speech enablers to censor
the speech that they provide.135 For example, in the civil context, tort
regimes that create liability for speech providers may shift the chill that,
in theory, exists on speech from government regulation to private
censorship, essentially converting speech platforms into speech police.
This is the case with popular social media websites like Facebook and
Twitter, whose terms and conditions permit them to remove offending
posts and photographs even without the consent of the individual who
posted them.136 In many instances, these terms and conditions are
premised upon an understanding of the types of speech the law both
permits and forbids. Third-party intermediaries, therefore, frequently
serve as censors, even though (at least in the online context) they are
shielded from liability for enabling the expression.137
133. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (“The First
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney,
conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most
salient political issues of our day.”).
134. Id.; see Ross, supra note 82, at 937 (noting that there are chilling concerns if a speaker is
left “unable to determine whether his speech his protected without the assistance of a lawyer”).
135. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2012) (creating a safe-harbor affirmative defense to
possession of child pornography when the individual possesses less than three images and promptly
destroys them or submits them to appropriate law enforcement officials).
136. See,
e.g.,
FACEBOOK
COMMUNITY
STANDARDS,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (containing guidelines
for when Facebook will remove posts and photographs); TWITTER TERMS OF SERVICE,
https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (noting the terms of service).
137. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998) (immunizing providers and users of interactive computer
services from civil liability for content generated by other information content providers).
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While the notion of third-party censorship may present a concern in
the tort context,138 it provides weak support for the ongoing use of the
chilling effect test. The fact that a particular speaker may exclude
categories of expression based on his or her own understanding of how
laws will be applied likely does not necessarily chill expression. The
Internet is replete with alternative avenues of communication, and it is
difficult to envision even illegal expression being removed from every
single website that exists.139 Thus, those speakers who are subjected to
third-party censorship are unlikely to censor their own online expression.
Accordingly, even when the chilling effect doctrine relies upon the
knowledge of third parties as the source of the potential chill, the doctrine
makes unsupported assumptions about hypothetical behavior.
C. Willingness to Conform
Because the chilling effect doctrine assumes that the speaker—having
properly assessed the law and its application to his or her expression—
will not engage in speech, the concept is premised on the notion that the
speaker will willingly conform his or her expressive conduct to the law
as he or she understands it. At least in the context of lawsuits that
presently exist or have been litigated in the courts, this notion seems
almost silly. For a speech-related dispute to be resolved by a tribunal, a
speaker must either have presented his or her speech and undergone
criminal prosecution,140 or must have desired to present his or her speech
so deeply that he filed a civil lawsuit against the government just to assert
his or her right to do so.141 In each of these scenarios, a speaker has not
realistically been chilled. Rather, he or she has asserted his or her right
to speak through the panoply of legal remedies available to him or her.
Thus, at least with regard to the existence of free speech litigation, the
138. See Chander and Le, supra note 118, at 523–24 (noting censorship issues in private liability
regimes).
139. For example, child pornography is replete on the Internet despite aggressive efforts by law
enforcement, prosecutors, and legislators to eliminate sexually explicit images of children online.
Although the precise quantity of illegal child pornography available on the World Wide Web is
unknown, studies have estimated that at least one million distinct images of children engaged in
sex acts remain in cyberspace. Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, The Problem of Internet
Child
Pornography,
CTR.
FOR
PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING
(2006),
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/child_pornography/print/.
140. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 159 (1969) (reversing the
defendant’s conviction for conducting a parade without a permit on grounds that local parade permit
ordinance violated the First Amendment).
141. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 493–95 (1965) (invalidating the definition
of subversive organization in Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law after
plaintiffs filed civil suit to enjoin prosecution under the act).
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notion of a chilling effect is a misnomer.
The frequency with which people assert their First Amendment right
to free speech further belies the notion that speakers actually comply with
speech-related regulations. A study by the Newseum Institute suggests
that a majority of Americans are aware that the First Amendment, by
name, protects their freedom of speech.142 Pop culture is brimming with
references to the freedom to speak one’s mind without government
influence.143 Data reported by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts suggests that as much as 15 percent of all litigation in
federal district court is related to the First Amendment.144 Thus, while
people may not necessarily know or have access to the vast web of
government regulations that govern their speech, they are most certainly
aware, in some general sense, that they have a constitutional right to
engage in free speech.
Focusing on the costs and risks associated with litigation tells only part
of the story about the likelihood that people will seek to vindicate their
free speech rights rather than voluntarily forego them. It is true that
judicial review, either in the criminal or civil context, is one mechanism
by which individuals might raise First Amendment challenges, and it is
equally true that litigation is expensive and perhaps unsuccessful. 145

142. Terence P. Jeffrey, Newseum: Only 19% Know 1st Amendment Guarantees Freedom of
Religion, CNS NEWS (July 6, 2015, 10:37 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-pjeffrey/newseum-only-19-know-1st-amendment-guarantees-freedom-religion.
143. For example, John Goodman’s character in the cult-classic film The Big Lebowski
famously remarks “I’ve got news for you: the Supreme Court has roundly rejected prior restraint.”
THE BIG LEBOWSKI (Working Title Films 1998). A popular episode of the adult cartoon The
Simpsons also features a discussion of the right to free speech after Bart, the lead character,
“moons” the American flag at school. Scott Bomboy, What We Can Learn About the Constitution
from
the
Simpsons,
NAT’L
CONST.
CTR.
(Jan.
13,
2015),
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/01/what-we-can-learn-about-the-constitution-from-thesimpsons/.
144. Statistics collected from the civil cover sheet form required to be filed with all incoming
lawsuits indicate that, out of 263,874 civil cases terminated in 2014, 16,828 dealt with non-specified
civil rights claims and challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes. Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics, U.S. CTS. http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics (last visited Sept. 19, 2016). Although data is not available as to what portion of the civil
rights and state constitutional challenges raised First Amendment claims, it is clear from the federal
civil cover sheet form that this category does not include claims related to voting rights,
employment discrimination, housing discrimination, or disability rights, because those types of
cases are listed under separate categories.
See U.S. DIST. CT. FORM JS 44,
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/civil-forms/civil-cover-sheet (last visited Sept. 19, 2016). Thus, it
is fair to assume that at least a substantial percentage of the 16,828 cases involve First Amendment
issues.
145. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010); Virginia v. Hicks,
539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
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But speakers have at least one additional option when faced with a
potential chill on their expression: legislative lobbying. A review of
Congressional attempts to sanitize sexually explicit speech on the Internet
demonstrates that lawmakers are receptive to revising their regulations to
comport with the First Amendment.146 In yet another example, a
grassroots political campaign helped defeat the Stop Online Piracy Act
(“SOPA”)147 and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (“PIPA”),148
which were controversial pieces of proposed federal legislation that,
according to free speech advocates, would have extended liability for
innocent intellectual property violations and potentially shuttered
websites containing otherwise protected expression.149 The regulation of
speech, after all, is the result of a democratic process in which putative
speakers and their advocates are welcomed to participate.150 These
examples represent only a few of the many scenarios in which voters have
helped shape speech-related laws through political participation.
Given that speakers are generally aware of their right to engage in free
expression, and have a number of mechanisms for challenging
regulations on their expression, the chilling effect doctrine’s reliance on
an assumption of compliance is misplaced.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO CHILL
When the chilling effect concept is broken down into its analytical
assumptions, the doctrine collapses. Individuals cannot be expected to
know and understand all of the possible regulations on their expression,
particularly in light of the fact that free speech is a fundamental right.151
Moreover, requiring speakers to take active steps to uncover all possible
regulations in advance of speaking imposes too harsh of a burden on the
146. Although it was the courts and not necessarily individual lobbying efforts that lead to the
invalidation of early Congressional enactments targeting sexually explicit speech online,
Congress’s numerous revisions and reenactments—including both the Communications Decency
Act and the Child Pornography Prevention Act and their various amendments—were all the subject
of intense political campaigns led by pro-family organizations. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2308
(1997) (statement of Sen. Daniel Coats) (citing brief in support of the Act filed by Focus on the
Family, the Religious Alliance Against Pornography, and similar morality-based organizations).
147. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
148. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property
Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
149. Julianne Pepitone, SOPA Explained: What It Is and Why It Matters, CNN MONEY (Jan.
20, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/17/technology/sopa_explained/.
150. Ross, supra note 82, at 919–20; see John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1501–02 (1975) (arguing in favor of balancing public interest in restricting speech and the public
harm speech causes in assessing First Amendment protection).
151. De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
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speaker. Applying speech-related laws to hypothetical speech often
requires the assistance of a lawyer, and, as stated, even lawyers might
guess incorrectly.152 Litigants who bring First Amendment cases before
the courts clearly assert a right on behalf of their clients not to comply
with speech restrictions. Assessing whether one hypothetical speaker has
engaged in self-censorship is an impossible task, at best.
A better approach is one that considers how proposed speech would
fare under the challenged regulation by assessing the direct impact of the
law on expression. This approach is derived from Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books,153 which is widely considered to constitute the opinion of the
Court.154 At issue in Alameda Books was whether an ordinance that
restricted the location of adult bookstores was targeted at secondary
effects—crime, devalued property, litter, and the like—created by such
businesses, or instead targeted the content of the speech presented by
sexually explicit enterprises.155 In resolving this inquiry, Justice
Kennedy was clear that the government cannot reduce the availability of
protected expression under the guise of reducing the undesired effects of
that expression.156 Rather, the question must be one of outcomes: how
will the targeted speech fare once the challenged regulations are
applied?157
Justice Kennedy’s focus on how speech would fare after the zoning
restrictions were imposed is of great utility in resolving the problems
created by the chilling effect doctrine. Instead of focusing on whether
putative speakers would know of the law’s existence, anticipate its
application to their expression, and engage in self-censorship, courts
152. Kendrick, supra note 105, at 1653–54.
153. 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. See, e.g., Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 880 (11th Cir.
2007) (holding that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Alameda Books was resolved on the
narrowest ground and therefore constitutes the holding of the Court); World Wide Video of
Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Ben’s Bar, Inc.
v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (same).
155. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 429–33.
156. Id. at 449–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy made similar statements in his
majority opinion in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (“The Government
may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does
not become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the
reverse. ‘[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished
is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted . . . . The overbreadth
doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of
protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 612 (1973))).
157. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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should instead assess how the law would treat a putative speaker’s speech
when the speaker presented it. Would the law criminalize the expression
or allow it? Would the speaker be subject to prior restraint, requiring
official governmental permission to engage in the expression? Would
these outcomes survive First Amendment scrutiny? In essence, instead
of assuming that a speaker will self-censor, courts instead should assume
that a speaker will speak, and then determine whether the First
Amendment will tolerate the outcome. The inquiry should therefore
focus on the outcome of a law’s application to hypothetical speech, and
not whether such speech is likely to exist or be chilled. As such, a test
that analyzes the speech regulation’s direct impact, rather than its ability
to chill hypothetical expression, is more consistent with the First
Amendment.
Combining the knowledge-related assumptions158 with the behaviorrelated assumptions,159 there are six possible categorical results, outlined
in Table 1,160 where regulation confronts speech.
First, a speaker’s desired speech might (1) be unprotected by the First
Amendment, (2) be incorrectly assumed to be subjected to a law
prohibiting it when no law actually precludes it, and (3) be presented
anyway, despite the speaker’s perception that it is unlawful. 161 In this
instance, the First Amendment is not violated if the speaker is ultimately
prosecuted because the speech itself was not subject to constitutional
protection at the outset.
Second, a speaker might (1) desire to communicate unprotected
speech, (2) correctly assume the law prohibits his speech, and (3) desire
to present it anyways.162 Here, too, courts should be unconcerned if the
speech is prohibited, because the suppression of the expression is a
constitutionally-permissible outcome.163
Third, a speaker might (1) offer unprotected expression, (2) incorrectly
guess as to the application of the law to his speech, and (3) impose a selfchill.164 This is the most constitutionally-permissible outcome because
the law has served its desired function of prohibiting unlawful speech
before it occurs. If there is a place where chilling effect means anything
158. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the knowledge-related assumptions).
159. See supra Part II.C (discussing the behavior-related assumptions).
160. Infra tbl. 1.
161. Infra tbl. 1, l. 1.
162. Infra tbl. 1, l. 2.
163. Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 56 (2011).
164. Infra tbl. 1, l. 3.
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at all, it is here: where speech-prohibitive regulations actually silence
impermissible speech.
From a First Amendment standpoint, one of the greatest concerns
involves expression that is fully constitutionally protected. For instance,
the First Amendment might protect the speaker’s desired expression, the
speaker may correctly assume that it is not covered by a law prohibiting
other expression, and the speaker might present the speech.165 This result
is consistent with Schauer’s view of the concept of chilling effect: by
encouraging greater specificity in the drafting of legislation, the chilling
effect doctrine ensures that speech that is protected will be left
unregulated and, essentially, “unchilled.”166 Only in the gray area—
where a speaker that desires to present protected expression, but is chilled
either by his or her misunderstanding or correct interpretation that a law
prohibits his or her speech—is the outcome constitutionally
problematic.167
But a consideration of this category of chilled speech requires
excessive mental gymnastics. The court must first envision the
hypothetical speech to determine if it is protected by the First
Amendment. Then, the court must assess whether putative speakers
would understand that the law covers their speech and would make
correct assumptions about how the nuances of the regulation apply to
their expression. In the process, courts may dismiss cases in which the
challenged regulation does not actually apply to the desired expression
on standing grounds. Courts may also make incorrect judgments about
how a law might apply to non-existent speech, particularly when a case
arises before a statute has been enacted.
There are simply too many unsupported assumptions in applying the
chilling effect doctrine to imagined speech from imagined speakers.
Dissecting the chilling effect doctrine in this way exposes precisely why
an outcome-based approach is superior to the existing doctrine. A
simpler approach is one in which the speech is assumed to exist and then
subjected to the relevant form of existing First Amendment scrutiny. This
test—based upon the direct impact of the regulation on existing speech—
would eliminate the guesswork implicit in determining whether a
regulation chills too much speech or too many speakers.
To test the boundaries of the direct impact approach, consider again
the example of the suburban housewife supporting her cousin’s
165. Infra tbl. 1, l. 4.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 82–90 (discussing the first school of thought led by
Schauer that favors categorical approaches to regulation).
167. Infra tbl. 1, ll. 5–6.
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schoolboard campaign by posting a yard sign.168 Assume a local
ordinance prohibits her speech because it effectively bans signs on private
property other than signage necessary to identify the residence or
business prohibits. Ordinary chilling effect analysis would permit the
housewife to file a lawsuit before assembling her yard sign, claiming that
she is afraid to violate the law and has, resultantly, censored her own
speech. The housewife’s self-imposed chill would therefore likely be
sufficient to confer standing to challenge the sign restriction. But the
chilling effect doctrine is less useful in protecting speech when the
analysis shifts to whether there is a sufficient constitutional harm to
invalidate the ordinance. Applying an overbreadth analysis, the
housewife can only prevail if she can show that the ordinance would
prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech, or, in other words, that
the ordinance is substantially overbroad.169 This shifts the burden to the
housewife to demonstrate that other property owners desire to erect
political or religious signs, or signs communicating an expressive
message beyond identifying the nature of the residence.170 She must
therefore rely upon the non-existent and allegedly self-censored speech
of others to demonstrate why her own speech ought to exist.171 And she
might not be successful in this endeavor.172
Employing the direct impact test derived from Justice Kennedy’s
Alameda Books opinion would actually produce a more speech-protective
result in this case.173 Under the direct impact test, the court would look
only to the housewife’s proposed speech and would then determine
whether the ordinance imposes a lawful or unlawful burden upon that
speech. In other words, the court would assume that the speech in
question exists, and then ask how that speech fares under the regulation.

168. See supra text accompanying notes 112–114 (referring to a housewife’s likely lack of
knowledge of laws governing her expression).
169. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–93 (2008).
170. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 584–85 (2002) (discussing
the plaintiff’s burden in demonstrating substantial overbreadth).
171. See, e.g., id. (holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the Child Online
Protection Act was substantially overbroad in its reliance on the application of community
standards to online speech); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731–32 (2000) (rejecting an
overbreadth challenge to the ordinance that created an eight-foot buffer zone around individuals at
health care facilities on grounds that the speech it targeted was properly prohibited).
172. In Free Speech Coal. Inc. v. Attorney General U.S., 787 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated,
825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016), for example, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful at demonstrating that a
substantial amount of speech would be prohibited by the challenged law (18 U.S.C. § 2257),
although it was clear that the plaintiffs’ own speech had been subject to a chilling effect.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 153–157 (explaining Justice Kennedy’s opinion and
the direct impact text).
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This approach would take the place of looking to non-existent
hypothetical speech and then determining if the quantum of suppressed
speech is sufficiently substantial to strike down the law. Here, the
housewife would prevail in invalidating the ordinance because the
ordinance imposes a prior restraint on her protected political expression
absent a compelling government interest or appropriate procedural
safeguards.174 Thus, borrowing from Justice Kennedy’s outcomes-based
approach in Alameda Books, her speech would not fare well under the
ordinance.175
As this example demonstrates, the direct impact test has significant
advantages over the chilling effect test. First, it focuses on individual,
measurable speech rather than collective, unknowable speech. It
empowers individual litigants to challenge speech-restrictive regulations
without the added burden of hypothesizing how other speakers might
react to the law in question. Second, the direct impact test eliminates the
assumptions of knowledge and conformity that underlie the chilling
effect doctrine, thereby increasing the likelihood that a speech regulation
will be struck down.176 Rather than requiring that putative speakers
proactively censor themselves based upon laws they may or may not
know exist to find a law invalid, the direct impact test instead assumes
speech exists and assesses whether that speech is (a) protected by the First
Amendment, and (b) subject to governmental regulation that violates the
First Amendment based on existing overbreadth, vagueness, prior
restraint, or time, place, and manner scrutiny.
Opponents of the direct impact test might question its focus on
individual expression and worry that the unknowable—but surely
existent—set of speakers who self-censor in the wake of government
regulation will be left out of the analysis. This fear, though, is
unnecessary. If a court strikes a challenged enactment because its direct
impact on speech contravenes the First Amendment, the path will be
cleared for all speakers—even those who have hypothetically silenced
themselves—to engage in free expression. The direct impact test,
therefore, protects speakers who feel a chilling effect even if the court
does not expressly consider their speech in its analysis.
174. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (holding that prior restraint regimes
must contain the procedural safeguards of prompt issuance and prompt judicial review to pass
constitutional muster); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010)
(holding that laws that burden political speech are subjected to strict scrutiny and cannot be upheld
absent a compelling government interest).
175. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 450 (2013); see supra text
accompanying notes 153–157 (explaining Justice Kennedy’s opinion and the direct impact text).
176. See supra Part II (discussing the faulty assumptions underlying the chilling effect).
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The direct impact test might also be critiqued on the basis that it
undercuts the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, but this too is
unfounded. A court may still invalidate an overbroad or vague law based
on how existing speech would fare under its regulations. 177 To be sure,
it is not necessary to generate a master list of hypothetical speakers and
imaginary speech to assess whether a law is constitutional. Rather, the
law’s impact on existing, real, tangible, and measurable speech is
sufficient for determining a law’s constitutionality. As such, even if the
chilling effect doctrine is replaced with the direct impact test, the
traditional concepts of vagueness and overbreadth would still remain
intact.
CONCLUSION
Whether a law might deter putative speakers from engaging in their
desired expression is an important concern, but one that should be
abandoned as a measure of constitutional standing and harm. Rather than
assuming that hypothetical speech would be deterred under a challenged
regulation, and then assessing whether the quantum of suppressed speech
offends the First Amendment, courts should instead assume that the
hypothesized speech will exist regardless, and then determine whether
the impact of the regulation on that speech is constitutionally tolerable.
A test that measures speech based solely on the former rests upon too
many unsupported assumptions about the knowledge, analytical abilities,
and behavior of the putative speaker. As a result, the judiciary would be
wise to abdicate speculation and conjecture in favor of a standard that
assesses the direct impact of challenge restrictions on speech. Thus,
when it comes to the chilling effect doctrine, courts should—for lack of
a better term—just chill.

177. Justice Kennedy’s decision in Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 234 (2002),
is indicative of the point. In Ashcroft, the Court struck down the Child Pornography Prevention
Act in part on the basis of its impact on legitimate works of art and not by reference to imaginary
speech not yet in existence. Id. at 255.
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TABLE 1: Chilling Effect Outcomes

Did the
Is the speech
speaker guess
constitutionally correctly as
protected?
to the law’s
application?
No
No

Did the
speaker
engage in a
self-imposed
chill?
No

First
Amendment
Violation?
No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

